New California Law Results in Death Sentence Reversal for Anthony Bankston, a Black Man Characterized by White Prosecutors as a ​‘Bengal Tiger’ to a Jury

On June 1, 2026, the California Supreme Court reversed the death sen­tence of Anthony Bankston under the retroac­tive appli­ca­tion of the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA) – the first cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment rever­sal under this Act in California’s his­to­ry. The opinion asserts:

“In light of the pas­sage of the RJA, we now make clear that, what­ev­er the intent behind telling the sto­ry may be, the Bengal tiger sto­ry should no longer be told in California court­rooms. We have pre­vi­ous­ly cau­tioned that there is fre­quent­ly a thin line between per­mis­si­ble com­ment on the evi­dence and imper­mis­si­ble appeals to con­sid­er­a­tions that have no place in the judi­cial process. And as the leg­isla­tive find­ings indi­cate, the oft-told Bengal tiger sto­ry is one that car­ries with it a rec­og­nized risk of cross­ing that line. There is no rea­son to per­mit pros­e­cu­tors to con­tin­ue run­ning the risk of appeal­ing to bias­es that under­mine the very foun­da­tion of a sys­tem of equal jus­tice, sim­ply to make an unre­mark­able point about a defendant’s behav­ior out­side a con­trolled courtroom setting.”

After being con­vict­ed and found guilty of mur­der­ing a rival gang mem­ber, Mr. Bankston rep­re­sent­ed him­self in court in 1991. During clos­ing argu­ments, the pros­e­cu­tor char­ac­ter­ized Mr. Bankston as a Bengal Tiger, telling the jury “[W]e see him here in court. We know that he’s able to rep­re­sent him­self. You see him in a nice lit­tle tie and a suit. You see that he’s artic­u­late. But, ladies and gen­tle­men, the per­son that we see here in court is not the per­son that was out on the streets, it’s not the per­son that con­ducts him­self in the man­ner in which we heard about in cus­tody.” The opin­ion acknowl­edges that such state­ments are ​“high­ly offen­sive and inap­pro­pri­ate” and “[b]ecause use of ani­mal imagery is his­tor­i­cal­ly asso­ci­at­ed with racism, use of ani­mal imagery in ref­er­ence to a defen­dant is racial­ly dis­crim­i­na­to­ry and should not be per­mit­ted in our court sys­tem.” This val­i­dates the expe­ri­ences of a num­ber of Black cap­i­tal defen­dants in court­rooms and research that notes: ​“The use of ani­mal imagery to describe Black crim­i­nal defen­dants plays into a long and bru­tal his­to­ry of dehu­man­iz­ing Black peo­ple. Twentieth cen­tu­ry news­pa­pers com­pared Black men to ​‘the eyes of a trapped ani­mal’, ​‘a human hye­na’, ​‘the preda­tors of the African plain’ when cov­er­ing their exe­cu­tions.” The CRJA explicitly states:

“The state shall not seek or obtain a crim­i­nal con­vic­tion or seek, obtain, or impose a sen­tence on the basis of race, eth­nic­i­ty, or national origin.”

A defen­dant can prove a vio­la­tion of the CRJA by bring­ing forth a claim of racial­ly dis­crim­i­na­to­ry lan­guage defined as “…lan­guage that, to an objec­tive observ­er, explic­it­ly or implic­it­ly appeals to racial bias, includ­ing, but not lim­it­ed to, racial­ly charged or racial­ly cod­ed lan­guage, lan­guage that com­pares the defen­dant to an ani­mal, or lan­guage that ref­er­ences the defendant’s phys­i­cal appear­ance, cul­ture, eth­nic­i­ty, or nation­al ori­gin.” With this in mind, the Court accepts a pros­e­cu­tor’s use of refer­ring to a defen­dant as an ​“eager beaver,” ​“hap­py as a clam,” ​“free as a bird,” or ​“qui­et as a mouse.” as ​“none would appear to raise racial discrimination concerns.” [MORE]